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The his to ry o f pro paganda has  lo ng been clo sely intertwined with the develo pment o f mass  co mmunicatio n. In the twentieth century,
the wo rld experienced two  Wo rld Wars , the Co ld War, its  ending (o r the beginning o f a seco nd Co ld War), and numero us  territo rially-
co nfined wars  interspersed with peace (o r no n-war perio ds ). Many scho larly wo rks  asso ciate pro paganda with war (including the
Co ld War), and dis tinguish public diplo macy fro m war pro paganda.
Do  the s tructures  and ins titutio ns  utilized by the s tate to  dis seminate info rmatio n (including news) fo r fo reign po licy fundamentally
change in time o f war? A subs tantial literature ho lds  that a s tate’s  info rmatio n po licy largely defines  the nature o f its  po litical
regime. Did liberal demo cratic regimes , such as  the U.S., Britain, France o r Aus tralia, have fundamentally different info rmatio n
po licies  fro m tho se o f auto cratic o r autho ritarian regimes?
In appro aching these is sues  with respect to  Japan and Manzho uguo , I fo cus  o n three glo bal facto rs : the develo pment o f mass
po litics  in an era o f universal male suffrage, rapidly changing mass-co mmunicatio n techno lo gies  (especially glo bal cable netwo rks ,
the develo pment o f wireless  co mmunicatio n, electro nic pho to  delivery, and news  reels ), and the rise o f internatio nal public o pinio n
as  an impo rtant facto r in internatio nal po litics  in general, and the ins titutio nalizatio n o f Japanese news  pro paganda in particular.
In February 1932, the seco nd general electio n in Japan after the universal male franchise bill had passed the Diet gave Seiyūkai, o ne
o f the two  majo r parties  o f the time, a lands lide victo ry. Japan was  facing diplo matic and do mes tic crises , and Seiyūkai pro mised a
greatly expanded electo rate eco no mic reco very and an aggress ive China po licy. Five mo nths  earlier, in September 1931, Japan’s
Guando ng Army had begun a military incurs io n in No rtheas t China, and by December it had o ccupied a large part o f the regio n then
kno wn as  Manchuria. The Minseitō  Wakatsuki Cabinet (April–December 1931) fell in December, and the new Seiyūkai Prime Minis ter,
Inukai Tsuyo shi, to o k o ver and called fo r a general electio n in o rder to  gain a po pular mandate fo r his  new go vernment.
There were censo rship, co ercio n and bribery in the electio n pro cess , as  in many co ntempo rary parliamentary demo cracies  o f the
time. The pro blem, ho wever, was  no t limited to  these anti-demo cratic actio ns . Rather, po litical acto rs  and media o rganizatio ns  were
respo nding to  a new po litical enviro nment created by universal male suffrage and new teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gies  that fed war
fever. Fo r so me mo nths  befo re that February (even befo re September 1931, but especially subsequently) o ppo rtunis tic po liticians ,
military o fficers , and media o rganizatio ns  were utiliz ing no t o nly print media, but also  the new media o f radio  and newsreels  to
s to ke mass  natio nalism. A s ignificant majo rity o f vo ters  bo ught into  this  jingo ism and the package Seiyūkai o ffered: an aggress ive
China po licy so ld as  a key to  eco no mic reco very.
Ortho do x Japanese his to rical acco unts  tell us  that the May Fifteenth Incident o f 1932, in which Prime Minis ter Inukai was
assass inated by a terro ris t attack, marked the beginning o f the end o f parliamentary demo cracy in pre-war Japan. The electio n o f
February 1932 was , ho wever, equally impo rtant because the electo rate gave a mandate to  the then go vernment fo r the aggress io n in
China. It was  the actio n that set a co urse fo r subsequent full s cale war with China in 1937 and then with the United States , the o ther
Allied fo rces  and their co lo nies  in the regio n.
Thro ugho ut mo dern his to ry in Japan (and many o ther co untries ), expanded po litical participatio n has  been no  guarantee o f the
primacy o f peaceful alternatives  to  co lo nialism and war. Party po liticians , no t o nly military o fficers , have frequently led jingo ism.
Media was  also  no t o nly the victim o f s tate repress io n, fo r it to o  co ntributed subs tantially to  war mo ngering. Jingo ism, after all,
sells  newspapers  and magaz ines  and creates  bro adcas t audiences . Mo s t impo rtantly, many vo ters  suppo rted expans io nis t po licies .
Are s imilar patterns  emerging in co ntempo rary Japan, indeed, in bo th China and Japan, at a time o f mo unting territo rial co nflict?
In February 1932, during a time o f eco no mic cris is , mass  po litics  undermined mo derate fo reign po licy o ptio ns . Demo cracy did no t
prevent Japan fro m taking the path to  co lo nial expans io n and war. Eight decades  later, we can reflect anew o n lesso ns  fro m the
1930s .
Abst ract :
Japan’s  info rmatio n po licy did no t change suddenly during the Manchurian Cris is  in September 1931–March 1933. Rather there was
co ntinuing develo pment o f s tate po licy and ins titutio ns  fo r news  pro paganda in respo nse to  two  o ngo ing pheno mena: gro wing
mass  po litical participatio n as  indicated by universal manho o d suffrage, and techno lo gical changes  in mass  media and
co mmunicatio n.
The Japanese metro po litan go vernment did, ho wever, begin a co o rdinated and sys tematic appro ach to  news  pro paganda during the
Manchurian Cris is , o ne primarily driven by fo reign po licy co ncerns , rather than co ncerns  with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l. At the same
time, in the perio d that is  o ften regarded as  the beginning o f Japan’s  diplo matic iso latio nism, MOFA and o ther fo reign po licy elites
actively so ught to  engage internatio nal public o pinio n thro ugh management o f the news  fo r o verseas  pro paganda. They further
emphas ized co o rdinatio n between metro po litan centre, To kyo , and a parallel news  ins titutio n in Japanese-o ccupied Manchuria in
1931–3. The pro cess  o f unifying news  co verage, ho wever, met s tro ng o ppo s itio ns  fro m vario us  s take ho lders  in 1931–5.
Key Wo rds: pro paganda, internatio nal news  netwo rk, internatio nal public o pinio n, mass  po litics , media and war, public diplo macy,
Japanese fo reign po licy, the Manchurian Incident
Ortho do x internatio nal his to ry sees  the 1930s  as  the perio d o f a ‘dark valley’. The Great Depress io n that s tarted with the Wall
Street s to ck market crash o f 24 Octo ber 1929  spread glo bally in the early 1930s . While the U.S.S.R., almo s t unaffected by this
eco no mic turmo il, co ntinued its  eco no mic expans io n, fascism emerged and gained s trength especially in Germany and Italy. Natio nal
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Map 1: Glo bal divisio n o f  news dist ribut io n
unity go vernments  were fo rmed in Britain and Japan, and even the United States  o pted fo r greater s tate eco no mic interventio n.
Co mpeting fo r co ntracting markets , empires  mo ved to  fo rm blo c eco no mies . The perio d was  to  lead to  the Seco nd Wo rld War, which
killed tens  o f millio ns  thro ugho ut the wo rld.
In No rtheas t As ia, the 1930s  began with a war and ended with a war. What co ntempo rary Japanese called the ‘Manchurian Incident’
(Manshū jihen) s tarted with a railway explo s io n near Mukden in Manchuria o n 18  September 1931. It was  planned by the Japanese
garriso n, the Guando ng Army, which was  s tatio ned in Manchuria to  pro tect the Japanese leased territo ries  alo ng the So uth
Manchuria Railway and in the so uthern part o f the Liao do ng peninsula. Claiming the explo s io n was  Chinese pro vo catio n, and us ing
this  as  an excuse to  expand its  military co ntro l to  the who le o f Manchuria, the garriso n executed a well-planned campaign.
The fo rces  o f the warlo rd o f Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang (Chang
Hsueh-liang), presented little res is tance, altho ugh the fighting with
o ther Chinese res is tance fo rces  was  o ften bitter, pro ducing many
killed and wo unded o n bo th s ides . The fighting in Shanghai ( late
January–early May 1932) was  also  fierce. The campaign in Manchuria
resulted in Japan’s  military o ccupatio n o f Manchuria (the eas tern
three pro vinces ) by February 1932, which was  then expanded to  Inner
Mo ngo lia (Rehe pro vince) in early March 1933. The Guando ng Army
created Japan’s  puppet regime, Manzho uguo  (1 March 1932), and
then, unhappy with the League o f Natio ns ’ so lutio n to  the Manchurian
Incident, Japan withdrew fro m the League o n 27 March 1933.
The Manchurian ‘Incident’ is  o ften unders to o d as  a watershed fo r
Japan; do mes tically, it marked a shift fro m the liberal parliamentary
demo cracy o f the 1920s  to  an autho ritarian regime do minated by the
military. Externally, Japan’s  fo reign po licy changed fro m
internatio nalis t, co o perative diplo macy to  iso latio nism driven by
ris ing natio nalism. This  led Japan to  a seco nd war with China (1937–
45) and then to  war with the Allied Po wers  and their co lo nies  in As ia
and the Pacific regio n (1941–5).1
Many wo rks  o n the s tate and media in Japan during the Manchurian
Incident unders tandably fo cused, and co ntinue to  fo cus , o n the
s tate’s  repress io n o f the media and its  tho ught co ntro l. In this  view,
media o rganizatio ns  were victims  o f the s tate’s  co ercio n, which dragged a blinded po pulatio n into  the war.2
These wo rks , ho wever, o ften neglected the fo reign po licy aspects  o f the s tate’s  info rmatio n po licy, and thus  to ld o nly part o f the
s to ry. This  chapter examines  the s tate’s  info rmatio n po licy during the Manchurian Cris is , which I define as  a diplo matic cris is
between September 1931 and March 1933, no t as  an abrupt change o f co urse. It lo cates  the cris is  in the co ntinuing develo pment o f
the Japanese s tate’s  po licy and ins titutio ns  fo r news  pro paganda as  its  respo nse to  two  o ngo ing pheno mena: gro wing mass
po litical participatio n, and techno lo gical changes  in mass  media and co mmunicatio n.
 
The Japanese metro po litan s tate began a co o rdinated and
sys tematic appro ach to  news  pro paganda during the Manchurian
Cris is , driven mainly by fo reign po licy co ncerns , rather than co ncerns
with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l.
In 1931–3, the fo reign po licy elite, including military o fficers , did no t
cho o se iso latio nism. Acutely aware o f the need to  jus tify their
actio ns  to  the League o f Natio ns  and o ther po wers , they appealed to
‘internatio nal public o pinio n’, no t despite Japan’s  military
aggress io n, but because o f it. In this  perio d, which has  o ften been
regarded as  the beginning o f Japan’s  diplo matic iso latio nism, MOFA
actively so ught to  engage with internatio nal public o pinio n.3
MOFA and o ther fo reign po licy elites  began a pro cess  o f creating the
united natio nal/imperial news  agency as  the critical s trategic
o peratio nal agency fo r the s tate’s  co o rdinatio n o f o verseas  news
pro paganda. The chapter demo ns trates  the clo se co nnectio n
between the two  ins titutio n-making pro cesses  (the s tate’s  co o rdinating bo dy and the natio nal/imperial news  agency) at the
metro po litan centre, To kyo , and between this  pro cess  in To kyo  and the parallel ins titutio n making in Japanese-o ccupied Manchuria
in 1931–3. In this  co ntext, the Manzho uguo  News  Agency o r the MNA was  fo unded in Changchun in December 1932. The pro cess  o f
es tablishing the united natio nal/imperial news  agency in To kyo , ho wever, pro ved to  be a lo ng and winding ro ad.
T HE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT  AND MASS POLIT ICS 
Scho lars  o ften s tressed the ro les  o f the military and natio nalism during the Manchurian Cris is , and they also  assumed the
‘undemo cratic’ nature o f the military. They o ften, ho wever, neglected several crucial aspects  o f mass  po litics  and mass
co mmunicatio n in this  perio d.
Firs t, the ‘Manchurian Incident’ was  Japan’s  firs t war4 fo ught in the co ntext o f mass  (male) po litics . The Universal [Male] Franchise
Law was  pro mulgated in 1925. The firs t general electio n under this  law was  held in 1928, in which mass-based po litical parties
gained eight o ut o f the 466  seats  o f the Ho use o f the Representatives  (fo ur fo r the So cial Mass  Party and fo ur fo r o ther pro letarian
parties  [Musan seitō]).
 
Seco nd, greater mass  participatio n did no t result in an anti-war platfo rm in 1932. In the firs t general electio n o f 20  February 1932,
fo llo wing the Manchurian Incident, Seiyūkai, o ne o f the two  majo r bo urgeo is  parties , called fo r an aggress ive po licy in Manchuria and
eco no mic reco very, and wo n a lands lide victo ry agains t its  o ppo nent, Minseitō . Furthermo re, while the left (co mmunis ts ) who  were
the co re o f the pro letarian parties  that had been es tablished after 1925 argued fo r no n-aggress io n, they were suppressed by majo r-
party do minated go vernments . Mo reo ver, as  Andrew Go rdo n argues , the right wing o f these mass-based parties  came to  suppo rt an
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aggress ive po licy to wards  Manchuria.5
Third, the Manchurian Incident was  Japan’s  firs t electro nic mass-
media war with radio  and newsreels  playing a s ignificant ro le in
do mes tic war pro paganda. As  Lo uise Yo ung and Ikei Masaru
demo ns trate, in 1931–2, war s to ries  came to  the masses  no t o nly in
printed fo rm, but also  with vo ices  and mo ving pictures .6  The war was
also  repo rted with vivid pho to s . Electro nic transmiss io n o f pho to s
s till had to  wait until 1935 when AP launched ‘AP Wirepho to ’, which
wo uld beco me co mmo n in news  services  in the late 1930s . Yet news
media began to  use airplanes  and bro ught pho to s  to  readers  in the
late 1920s . Rengō , fo r example, s tarted do mes tic pho to  news  in
1928.7 The Manchurian Incident expanded the use o f this  new news
media, the pho to  service, to  o verseas  co verage. While Jo hn Do wer
demo ns trated ho w visual materials  such as  Nishikie caused s tro ng
emo tio nal respo nses  in Japan in previo us  wars ,8  by 1931 pho to
images  had beco me a do minant fo rm o f visual war repo rtage, adding
a greater sense o f reality o f war. When Japan’s  attack o n Shanghai in
January-March 1932 was  repo rted to  the wo rld with pho to s , it created
a majo r internatio nal sensatio n.
Fo urth, while the s tate s trengthened censo rship o n media o utlets
that were critical o f Japan’s  aggress io n in Manchuria, po s itive s to ries
created a bo o m in the print and electro nic mass  media markets .9
Recent analyses  o f majo r Japanese newspapers  sugges t that the s tate’s  censo rship and co ercio n, and military and right wing
o rganizatio ns ’ intimidatio n, indeed pro mpted self-censo rship. Yet they also  sho w that the newspapers  used the Manchurian Incident
to  increase circulatio n, and that their edito rs  and co rrespo ndents  had their o wn reaso ns  to  suppo rt the aggress io n.10
Fifth, the military in this  perio d was  deeply divided, and no t all were dismiss ive o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n sys tem. In 1930–2, there
was  a series  o f terro ris t incidents  in Japan, which invo lved Navy and Army o fficers . So me o fficers  used fo rce, attacked parliamentary
demo cracy, and wanted to  create a military dictato rship. The terro ris ts , ho wever, remained extremis t mino rities  in the military. Mo s t
military o fficers , especially at the to p, tried to  increase their po litical influence thro ugh the framewo rk o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n, no t
thro ugh a co up d’etat and/o r a military dictato rship. Upris ings  in 1930–2, therefo re, o ften targeted superio r o fficers  o r o ther
factio ns  within the military. While these events  radicalized military o fficers , the military co ntinued to  be divided by factio nal
co nflicts .
Sixth, many military o fficers  did no t dismiss , but fully appreciated, and so ught to  utilize fo r their o wn ends , mass  po litical
participatio n. Previo us  wo rks  o n the s tate and media o ften assumed the military’s  inherent undemo cratic attitudes  to wards  the
media. These wo rks  unders to o d that the military’s  increased po litical influence resulted in greater suppress io n o f o ppo s ing views
thro ugh censo rship, co ercio n, and phys ical intimidatio n. There is  indeed an inherent brutality in a pro fess io n which uses  fo rce. The
rigid hierarchy o f chain o f co mmand in the military also  go es  agains t the demo cratic principle o f o pen dis cuss io ns  amo ng equals .
At the same time, many o fficers  were well aware o f glo bal trends  and the po licies  and ins titutio ns  o f o ther co untries . While
repress ing o ppo s ing views , they unders to o d the need fo r and the po wer o f pro paganda in o rder to  secure mass  suppo rt fo r their
military actio ns  and budgets , and co nducted effective pro paganda in the 1920s  and 1930s . Majo r bo urgeo is  po litical parties  were
lo s ing credibility in the mid-late 1930s  because o f their tainted image (and the reality) o f co rruptio n with big bus iness  mo ney. At the
same time, the military, alo ng with the bureaucracy, emerged with an image as  a ‘clean’, ‘fair’, and ‘co mpetent’ po litical fo rce to  which
the masses  co uld entrus t s tate affairs .11 By the late 1930s , the military’s  (especially the Army’s ) do mes tic mass  pro paganda had
been building such po s itive images  fo r almo s t a decade.
Seventh, in the age o f mass  po litics , the main po litical acto rs  needed to  secure mass  suppo rt fo r their po licies .
THE ARMY IN MASS POLITICS: PROPAGANDA AND A TOTAL WAR SYSTEM,1927–30
Up until 1931, diverse minis tries  managed different areas  o f info rmatio n-related activities . The s tate’s  o nly attempt to  co o rdinate
and centralize such activities  in the 1920s  came fro m the Department o f Info rmatio n o f MOFA in 1924. This  co ncerned fo reign
po licy-relevant pro paganda and intelligence activities .
The attempt was , ho wever, no t fo llo wed up. Meanwhile, different minis tries  co ntinued to  co ntro l different aspects  o f the s tate’s
info rmatio n management. The Ho me Minis try was  in charge o f censo rship, and the Minis try o f Co mmunicatio n (MOC) o f
co mmunicatio n infras tructure. MOFA’s  Department o f Info rmatio n gathered o verseas  info rmatio n and co nducted o verseas  news
pro paganda, while its  Department o f Cultural Affairs  was  in charge o f o verseas  cultural pro paganda. The Army and the Navy each had
pro paganda/publicity departments . They were mainly co ncerned with do mes tic pro paganda. The Minis try o f Educatio n adminis tered
internatio nal educatio nal and cultural exchanges , and the Minis try o f Railways  managed internatio nal to urism.
MOFA had been leading o verseas  news  pro paganda. To gether with the no n-o fficial fo reign po licy elite, it had been respo nding to  the
two  glo bal trends: the develo pment o f greater mass  po litical participatio n, and the develo pment o f teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gy.
After the Firs t Wo rld War, Japan’s  fo reign po licy elite reco gnized the s ignificance o f ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’, no t o nly the public
o pinio n o f a specific co untry. MOFA’s  Department o f Info rmatio n was  created in o rder to  adjus t to  this  new demand, and to  deal with
fo reign po licy-relevant intelligence and news  pro paganda in general. Reco gniz ing the s ignificance o f Japan’s  o wn news  agencies , it
s trengthened Ko kusai and Tō hō  news  agencies .
Pho to  taken in fro nt o f the headquarters  o f Ko kusai, winter 1923.
Iwanaga Yūkich at the centre with cro ssed arms . Russell Kennedy is  o n the right s ide o f Iwanaga with glasses  and a bo w tie. Furuno
Ino seuke is  right behind Iwanaga.
So urce: Tsūshinshashi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi (To kyo : Edito r, 1958).
MOFA’s  initial idea o f pro paganda came fro m publicity and advertis ing in the mass  market. In co ntras t, the idea o f pro paganda in the
military, especially amo ng Army o fficers , o riginated in the pro paganda o f to tal war during  the Firs t Wo rld War.12 Yet bo th ideas  were
clo sely co nnected to  the develo pment o f mass  po litics  and teleco mmunicatio n techno lo gies . Pro paganda was  a means  to  utilize
what we no w call ‘so ft po wer’ (dis tinguished fro m the hard po wer o f military might). The s tate needed to  mo bilize so ft po wer,
Ko kusai News Agency St aff  and Family Members,
19 23
because civilian suppo rt (phys ical and mo ral) became crucial fo r it to
s tay in po wer and to  co nduct war effo rts . Pro paganda was  a means
o f mass  mo bilizatio n, no t by fo rce, but by co -o ptio n and persuas io n,
and the s tate needed to  utilize co ns tantly advancing co mmunicatio n
techno lo gies  and experts . In Japan, the Minis try o f the Army
es tablished the Newspaper Sectio n at its  minis ter’s  secretariat in
1920, which specialized in do mes tic pro paganda. Tho se who  were
po s ted to  this  sectio n, especially in the 1930s , seem to  have
unders to o d pro paganda as  a critical part o f a to tal war sys tem.13
After the Firs t Wo rld War, Army o fficers  became majo r advo cates  o f
the creatio n o f a to tal war sys tem. In the 1930s , they were called
kakushin ha o r s tatis t refo rmis ts , and fo rmed alliances  with like-
minded bureaucrats  in o ther minis tries .14 The to tal war sys tem was
in a sense the ultimate vers io n o f such s tatis t refo rm schemes . Ide
Yo shino ri argued that such schemes  became a glo bal trend. Many
s tates , including the U.S., Britain, Italy, Germany, and Japan, created
new minis tries  and departments  in the 1920s  in o rder to  respo nd to
a majo r cris is  caused by glo bal eco no mic and po litical s tructural
changes .15 Similar to  these s tate-led refo rm schemes , the to tal war
sys tem also  aimed to  es tablish a permanent sys tem fo r the ultimate
cris is , war, by dras tically refo rming po litical, eco no mic and so cial
s tructures  to  increase natio nal pro ductio n and effectively mo bilize
natio nal reso urces .
Advo cates  o f a to tal war sys tem, ho wever, were a specific kind o f
s tatis t refo rmis t, because they argued no t o nly fo r individual
minis tries ’ refo rms , but also  fo r the centralizatio n o f s tate po wer. In
their view, refo rms  o f individual minis tries  co uld no t deal with
current crises  and anticipated war. A mo re co o rdinated (inter-
minis terial) o r centralized (supra-minis terial) s tate actio n was
needed, and they wanted to  es tablish a s tro ng central o ffice fo r this
co o rdinatio n/centralizatio n.
Thro ugho ut the 1930s  and early 1940s , these Army advo cates  o f a to tal war sys tem wanted the Cabinet Office, no t their o wn
Minis try o f the Army o r the Army’s  General Staff Office, to  serve as  the s ite fo r this  central o ffice. This  meant that they intended to
create a to tal war sys tem within the framewo rk o f the Meiji Co ns titutio n, no t an Army dictato rship.16  Their path to ward a to tal war
sys tem, ho wever, was  neither co herent no r smo o th, and whether their vis io n was  realized o r no t is  debatable. We examine belo w
ho w these Army to tal war advo cates  began to  push their agenda during the Manchurian Cris is , ho w they regarded news  pro paganda
within such a to tal war sys tem, and ho w o ther acto rs  reacted to  their vis io n.
As  the firs t s tep to wards  a to tal war sys tem, they created a think tank o ffice at the Minis try o f the Army in June 1918. Its  duty was  to
research, fo rmulate, and pro po se po licy ideas  fo r material mo bilizatio n. Altho ugh the Army also  es tablished the Newspaper Sectio n
in 1920, to tal war advo cates  in the Army were co ncerned mo s tly with the mo bilizatio n o f war-relevant materials .17 Inspired by So viet
Russ ia’s  New Eco no mic Po licy (NEP), which began in 1921, they especially wanted to  increase eco no mic capacity and s trengthen
eco no mic mo bilizatio n.
To tal war advo cates  made little pro gress  until 1927. After so me trials  and setbacks , Army Minis ter, Ugaki Kazushige (January 1924–
April 1927, July 1929–April 1931), go t the Diet’s  appro val to  es tablish the Reso urce Bureau (Shigen kyo ku) at the Cabinet Office in
May 1927. As  Furukawa Takahisa and Michael Barnhart po int o ut, it was  the firs t central o rganizatio n fo r planning natio nal
mo bilizatio n.18  The bureau was  to  beco me a key civilian o ffice thro ugh which the Army wo uld influence po licy-making.19  At this
s tage, ho wever, it was  co ncerned with the mo bilizatio n o f material and human reso urces , no t info rmatio n.20
The Reso urce Bureau so o n included info rmatio n in its  natio nal mo bilizatio n plan. It pro duced a do cument in 1930  which Ishikawa
Junkichi regards  as  the s tarting po int o f Japan’s  natio nal mo bilizatio n plan.21 It was  entitled ‘On the Ins titutio n to  Prepare the
Co ntro l and Adminis tratio n o f Reso urces ’.22 The do cument clarif ied what the to tal war sys tem meant: ‘we need to  nurture reso urces ,
research o n reso urces , prepare human and material reso urces  in peace time, and create legal framewo rks  fo r their sys tematic use
during wartime’. Then it identif ied ‘the unificatio n o f info rmatio n and pro paganda [activities ]’ as  o ne o f the s ix prio rities .23
In this  do cument, Army o fficers  at the Reso urce Bureau articulated the ro le o f info rmatio n in the to tal war sys tem. It regarded
‘info rmatio n’ bo th as  a s ignificant reso urce fo r s tate po wer, and as  a means  fo r smo o th mo bilizatio n. Furthermo re, this  firs t
natio nal mo bilizatio n plan regarded o verseas  pro paganda and intelligence gathering as  impo rtant as , if no t mo re so  than, do mes tic
tho ught co ntro l. It emphas ized that the s tate needed to  co o rdinate info rmatio n-related activities  such as  gathering info rmatio n in
o rder to  kno w the enemy; do mes tic pro paganda in o rder to  maintain and fo s ter natio nal mo rale; reinfo rcing third co untries ’
favo urable attitudes  to wards  Japan; and weakening enemy natio nals ’ will to  fight.24 A large po rtio n o f info rmatio n-related activities
was , therefo re, o verseas  pro paganda and intelligence gathering. The po int is  wo rth s tress ing because scho lars  o ften sugges t that
the Army and its  to tal war agenda were mainly co ncerned with do mes tic tho ught co ntro l.
Do mes tic o pinio n, no netheless , mattered in to tal war. Acco rding to  Pak Sunae, between the late 1920s  and mid-1930s , the Army’s
Newspaper Sectio n pro duced a great number o f pro paganda pamphlets  in o rder to  educate the public o n the idea o f to tal war.
No tably, during the Manchurian Cris is  o f 1931–3, it is sued 123 pamphlets .25 They pro pagated a new and bro ader no tio n o f ‘natio nal
defence’ that s tressed the impo rtance o f mass  co ntributio n. The perio d co rrespo nded to  the emergence o f Japan’s  mass  po litics .
The Newspaper Sectio n clearly reco gnized the s ignificance o f mass  suppo rt fo r Army actio ns . Direct appeals  by the Army built up
mass  suppo rt fo r its  agenda fo r military expans io n and natio nal mo bilizatio n, and the idea o f a bro ader natio nal defence s tate in
the mid-late 1930s .
MOFA also  reco gnized the need fo r do mes tic pro paganda in this  critical perio d o f develo pment o f mass  po litics . In 1927, Ko mura
Kin’ichi, then Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n at MOFA, expanded his  department’s  s co pe beyo nd o verseas  news
pro paganda and intelligence activities . The department sho uld no w, Ko mura argued, pay attentio n to  the guiding do mes tic public
o pinio n o n fo reign po licy.26  Bo th the Army and MOFA, therefo re, were preparing fo r mass  po litics  befo re 1931.
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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS A REFERENCE POINT
The Manchurian Cris is  pro vided a catalys t fo r Japan’s  po licy elite to  fo rm a mo re co o rdinated po licy and ins titutio ns  fo r o verseas
news  pro paganda. This  did no t happen o vernight, ho wever. Co herent actio n did no t emerge until June 1932, and even then there were
different vis io ns  amo ng the po licy elite, which included high o fficials  o f MOFA, the Army, and the Navy, as  well as  members  o f the
Cabinet (and the Cabinet Office). The news  agency men, Iwanaga Yūkichi, Rengō ’s  Executive Managing Directo r (Senmu riji) and
Furuno  Ino suke, its  General Manager (Sōshihainin),27 also  co ntributed po licy ideas , and were respo ns ible fo r news  pro paganda.
While certain
Army o fficers
saw the
Manchurian
Cris is  as  an
o ppo rtunity
to  advance
their to tal
war sys tem
pro jects , in
1931–3, a
majo rity o f
the po licy
elite was
mainly
co ncerned
with
o verseas
news
pro paganda,
no t do mes tic
tho ught
co ntro l. As  a
result, they
unders to o d
the creatio n
o f the united
natio nal/imperial news  agency as  a mo s t urgent is sue, and let MOFA take the lead in this  perio d.
Japan’s  po licy elite had go o d reaso n to  prio ritize internatio nal public o pinio n in 1931–3. The Manchurian Incident was  a cris is  o f
Japan’s  relatio ns  no t o nly with China, but also  with the League o f Natio ns , its  member co untries  and the U.S. It was  also  an
internatio nal cris is .28  Only a few days  after the Japanese Guando ng Army began an attack in Manchuria, China’s  Natio nalis t
Go vernment appealed its  case agains t Japan to  the League (21 September 1931). As  a result, the Manchurian Incident entered the
League’s  co llective security sys tem, while it also  came to  the attentio n o f the U.S.-initiated internatio nal co nventio ns  (the Nine
Po wer Treaty, 1922 and the Pact o f Paris , 1928). The incident aro used  internatio nal public o pinio n at the League’s  General Assembly
and public o pinio n o f a no n-League member, the U.S. Furthermo re, Japan’s  attack o n Shanghai in late January 1932 to o k the lives  o f
expatriates  as  well as  Chinese, and ho rrifying news  and pho to s  o f the bo mbing o utraged Chinese and Euro -American metro po litan
public o pinio n.29
Develo pments  at the League in 1931–3 pro vide a reference po int fo r the fo rmatio n o f Japan’s  news  pro paganda po licy and
ins titutio ns . Having failed to  devise effective measures  to  s to p the Guando ng Army’s  aggress io n in September–No vember 1931, the
League decided o n 10  December to  send an inquiry co mmiss io n to  China and Japan. The co mmiss io n co mprised members  fro m
Britain, France, Italy, Germany and the U.S., and was  headed by the British Lo rd Victo r Lytto n (hence it was  kno wn as  the Lytto n
Co mmiss io n). It arrived in Japan o n 29  February 1932. The Guando ng Army created its  puppet s tate, Manzho uguo , o n 1 March 1932,
sho rtly befo re the co mmiss io n landed in China (14 March). The co mmiss io n co nducted an inquiry in China fro m 14 March to  28  June,
and examined the ‘incident’ o n the railway and the nature o f Manzho uguo . It then came back to  Japan via Ko rea o n 4 July, and went
back to  Beijing o n 20  July, where Lytto n wro te a draft repo rt.
The repo rt was  co mpleted o n September 4 and fo rmally sent to  the go vernments  o f Japan and China as  well as  o ther League
member co untries  o n 30  September 1932. The Japanese go vernment realized that while the repo rt was  sympathetic to  Japanese
interes ts  in Manchuria, it did no t reco gnize Manzho uguo  as  a ‘genuine’ natio n, no r Japanese actio ns  after 18  September 1931 as
‘self-defence’.
Lo s ing o n these two  crucial po ints , the Japanese go vernment hurriedly gave fo rmal reco gnitio n to  Manzho uguo , o n 15 September
1932. The League’s  Co uncil dis cussed the co mmiss io n’s  repo rt and its  pro po sed so lutio ns  in late 1932 and early 1933. Its  General
Assembly finally vo ted to  ado pt the co mmiss io n’s  pro po sal o n 24 February 1933. Japan cas t the o nly vo te agains t this  reso lutio n,
and special envo y Matsuo ka Yō suke led his  team in their dramatic exit fro m the assembly in pro tes t. The Japanese go vernment then
co mmunicated its  fo rmal no tice o f withdrawal fro m the League o n 27 March 1933. Acco rding to  League regulatio ns , withdrawal was
to  beco me effective two  years  after o fficial no tif icatio n.
Clo sely examining Japanese dealings  with the League in 1931–3, co ntempo rary o bservers  and later s cho lars  co ncluded that Japan
had ‘lo s t the battle fo r wo rld o pinio n’ to  China by March 1933.30  Between September 1931 and March 1933, ho wever, the Japanese
fo reign po licy elite wo rked hard to  win the sympathy o f this  very ‘internatio nal public o pinio n’. Japanese o verseas  pro paganda bo th
fro m To kyo  and fro m Japanese-o ccupied Manchuria targeted the Lytto n Co mmiss io n (between December 1931 and September
1932), and the League’s  Co uncil, its  General Assembly, its  member co untries , and the U.S.31
IWANAGA’S BLUEPRINT FOR THE ‘UNITED’ NEWS AGENCY, DECEMBER 1931
What was  happening to  Japan’s  news  pro paganda po licy and ins titutio ns  in the initial perio d o f the Manchurian Cris is  in 1931? There
is  little surviving archival material o n this  is sue. One no te by a MOFA o fficial, Amō  Eiji (1887–1968), which was  co mpiled in his
reprinted perso nal papers , gives  a clue. Amō  was  Directo r o f MOFA’s  Department o f Info rmatio n fro m June 1933 to  April 1937. In
April 1934 he created a glo bal sensatio n by co mmenting to  the press  that Japan wo uld o ppo se any eco no mic and o ther ass is tance
to  China by o ther po wers . This  became kno wn as  ‘Japan’s  Mo nro e Do ctrine declaratio n’. He later served as  Directo r-General o f the
Bo ard o f Info rmatio n fro m March 1943–July 1944). Amō , therefo re, held a central po s itio n in the s tate’s  info rmatio n po licy in the
years  leading up to  the war and during the war.32
Amō ’s  no te entitled ‘A Summary o f the Pro cess  o f the Es tablishment o f a New News  Agency’ chro nicled ho w Dō mei News  Agency
came into  being between 1931 and 1935.33 It was  written as  a MOFA departmental no te, and Amō  mus t have written it so me time in
1935 as  Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n.
Acco rding to  this  no te, MOFA made the very firs t mo ve to  co o rdinate fo reign news  pro paganda. MOFA initially pro po sed, it reco rded,
the creatio n o f a s tro ng news  agency, no t the es tablishment o f a s tate o ffice to  co o rdinate and supervise news  pro paganda
o peratio ns . In autumn 1931, so o n after the Guando ng Army had begun its  aggress io n in Manchuria, MOFA (under Fo reign Minis ter
Shidehara o f the Wakatsuki Cabinet) was  co ncerned abo ut the ‘bad press ’ o n Japan’s  actio ns  in the aftermath o f the ‘Manchurian
Incident’, and began research o n the creatio n o f a s tro ng news  agency. This  was  impo rtant, the no te co ntinued, because Japan
needed to  ‘defend itself agains t fo reign pro paganda and to  clearly explain Japan’s  case to  the wo rld’.34
The Amō  no te sugges ts  that the matter was  no t taken up until the next cabinet was  fo rmed. The Wakatsuki Cabinet, in which
Minseitō  was  the majo rity party, had pro mised the League to  res train the Guando ng Army’s  aggress io n and had failed in this
pro mise. Unable to  unify the cabinet, it res igned. The o ppo s itio n party Seiyūkai fo rmed the new cabinet o n 13 December 1931 with
Inukai Tsuyo shi (1855–1932) as  Prime Minis ter (he was  also  Fo reign Minis ter until mid-January 1932). This  was  o nly three days  after
the League’s  decis io n to  es tablish an inquiry co mmiss io n.
So o n after this  new Cabinet was  fo rmed, the Amō  no te s tated, Cabinet Secretary Mo ri Kaku (1882–1932) fo rmed a three-minis try
co mmittee (MOFA, the Army and the Navy) to  wo rk o ut a plan to  amalgamate Rengō  and Dentsū. The plan was  to  create a unified
news  agency in To kyo  to  s trengthen o verseas  news  pro paganda.35 Altho ugh Mo ri had clo se co nnectio ns  with the Army,36  it is  unclear
whether this  initiative came fro m Inukai, Mo ri, MOFA o r the Army.
The amalgamatio n o f the two  majo r news  agencies , Rengō  and Dentsū, became a mo s t urgent is sue fo r the fo reign po licy elite in
late 1931. They fo und co nflicting news  o n Manchuria by Rengō  and Dentsū co nfus ing bo th internatio nally and do mes tically. The
Cabinet Office, MOFA, the Army, the Navy, and Rengō  agreed that the ‘co rrect’ and ‘unified’ view o n Japanese po licy in Manchuria had
to  be presented to  the wo rld as  well as  to  the Japanese public.37
At this  precise mo ment when Mo ri ins tructed the three-minis try co mmittee to  wo rk o n this  amalgamatio n, the Executive Managing
Directo r o f Rengō , Iwanaga Yūkichi, wro te a pro po sal, ‘On the Fo rmatio n o f the State’s  Great News  Agency: the Amalgamatio n o f
Rengō  and Dentsū’.38  Iwanaga dis cussed this  pro po sal with Prime Minis ter Inukai, who  was  his  relative.39  He then mo s t likely
submitted it to  the abo ve three-minis try co mmittee. Co ns idering the timing (the pro po sal was  written after the League’s  decis io n to
send an inquiry co mmiss io n to  Japan and China), Iwanaga was  mo s t likely thinking abo ut ho w to  appeal the ‘Japanese case’ to  the
League and its  co mmiss io n.
Here, Iwanaga argued that a s tro ng and credible news  agency was  ‘abso lutely necessary fo r a mo dern s tate’. Such a co mpetent news
agency sho uld be public, he co ntinued. It sho uld co nso lidate media o rganizatio ns  in the natio n. It sho uld also  have edito rial
independence, but sho uld be ‘respo ns ible’ to  the s tate. Stress ing the s ignificance o f the credibility o f its  news , and being cautio us
abo ut the go vernment’s  ‘supervis io n and ass is tance’ (Kantoku enjo), Iwanaga sugges ted that this  news  agency sho uld ‘co ntribute to
the go vernment’s  po licy’ o n a vo luntary bas is . It sho uld no netheless  have, he argued, privileges  fro m the s tate, such as  exclus ive
right to  internatio nal wireless  co mmunicatio n. This  was  because mo s t o ther natio nal news  agencies  already had this  privilege, and
witho ut it, he ins is ted, the pro po sed news  agency wo uld no t be able to  co mpete with them.40  Iwanaga’s  pro po sal o f December 1931
was  the blueprint fo r what became Dō mei News  Agency in December 1935.
At the same time, Iwanaga and o ther members  o f the fo reign po licy elite were also  wo rking o n the creatio n o f a united news  agency
in military-o ccupied Manchuria.
THE MAKING OF THE ‘NATIONAL’ NEWS AGENCY FOR A PUPPET STATE, AND METROPOLITAN POLITICS, DECEMBER 1931–MAY 1932
IWANAGA’S BLUEPRINT
The Guando ng Army was  a do minant fo rce in the making o f bo th info rmatio n po licy in Manchuria and o f the Manzho uguo  News
Agency (Manshūko ku tsūshinsha) o r the MNA. The MNA was  es tablished in Changchun, the new capital city o f Manzho uguo , in
December 1932. The memo irs  o f MNA’s  fo unding members  (published in 1942) reveal that the garriso n relied o n two  expert gro ups .
One gro up came fro m the So uth Manchuria Railway Co mpany (SMR). So o n after the Guando ng Army’s  military aggress io n began in
September 1931, fo ur co mmiss io ned s taff members  (Shokutaku) o f the SMR were seco nded to  the Fo urth Department o f the
Guando ng Army’s  General Staff Office. This  department specialized in pro paganda wo rk. Acco rding to  Katō  Shinkichi, who  was  o ne
o f the fo ur, by 1931 SMR’s  Department o f Info rmatio n had been fo rmulating media and info rmatio n po licy in Manchuria fo r so me
time.41
The seco nd gro up o f experts  was  fro m Rengō , namely Iwanaga and Furuno , and Sasaki Kenji, who  was  sent to  Mukden as  a Rengō
co rrespo ndent in mid-No vember 1931.42 While the SMR men wo rked o n pro paganda within the military-o ccupied Manchuria, the
Guando ng Army relied o n Rengō  fo r o verseas  pro paganda. Rengō  eagerly o ffered help. Acco rding to  Sasaki’s  memo ir o f 1942, upo n
his  arrival at Mukden as  Rengō ’s  co rrespo ndent o n 17 No vember 1931, he called o n the Guando ng Army Headquarters . The
Guando ng Army to ld him that it saw ‘internal’ pro paganda go ing well in Manchuria, but was  co ncerned with its  ‘bad internatio nal
publicity’. They asked Sasaki’s  advice o n ‘internatio nal publicity’. He co ntacted Furuno  in To kyo , who  assured Sasaki that Rengō
wo uld co me up with a go o d so lutio n.
A mo nth later, o n 19  December 1931 (less  than a week after the fo rmatio n o f the new Inukai Cabinet in To kyo ), Iwanaga submitted
his  pro po sal to  the Guando ng Army: ‘On the Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia News  Agency’.43 In Japan, Iwanaga had the bes t
kno wledge and experience o f internatio nal news  pro paganda. He also  had intimate kno wledge o f Manchuria, having spent his  early
career as  a co lo nial o fficer o f the SMR in Changchun in the 1910s . Tho se who  were invo lved in the making o f the Manzho uguo  News
Agency (MNA) regarded Iwanaga’s  pro po sal as  its  blueprint.44
In December 1931, therefo re, jus t after the fo rmatio n o f the Inukai Cabinet, and aro und the time when the League o f Natio ns
decided to  send an inquiry co mmiss io n to  Japan and China, Iwanaga wro te two  pro po sals , o ne fo r the united natio nal/imperial news
agency at the metro po litan centre, To kyo , and ano ther fo r a news  agency fo r Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia. He viewed the two
ins titutio ns  as  integral to  Japan’s  news  po licy.
When he wro te the pro po sal o n the news  agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia, ho wever, the Japanese military o ccupatio n did no t
enco mpass  the who le o f Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia. The regime, Manzho uguo , was  also  yet to  be es tablished. Iwanaga was ,
therefo re, bas ing his  pro po sal o n two  assumptio ns  that were mo re o r less  shared by o ther fo reign po licy elites  in To kyo  in
December 1931.
The firs t assumptio n was  that a certain trans itio nal adminis trative bo dy sho uld be fo rmed in the Japanese-o ccupied area in
Manchuria. This  meant that he regarded the current Guando ng Army o ccupatio n o f Manchuria as  a fait acco mpli.45
By December 1931, many Japanese fo reign po licy elites  were suppo rting an o ptio n o f creating an ‘auto no mo us ’ regime in the
o ccupied area, altho ugh there was  no  unanimo us  view o n what fo rm this  regime sho uld take. The Guando ng Army initially had wanted
to  annex the regio n. Already by 22 September 1931, ho wever, it decided to  create a pro -Japan regime, which was  ‘virtually’ separated
fro m the Chinese Natio nalis t Go vernment. Japan wo uld co ntro l its  defence and diplo macy.46  Such an auto no mo us  regime was  a
no n-annexatio n o ptio n. In this  way it was  ho ped, Japan co uld appease o ther po wers  and the League o f Natio ns . At the same time, it
co uld co ntro l the area, secure Japan’s  interes ts , and exclude o ther po wers ’ interventio n.47 In late Octo ber, the Guando ng Army
argued this  pro -Japan regime sho uld be an ‘independent’ s tate with no  co nnectio n with the Natio nalis t Go vernment; a s tate which
‘o n the surface’ was  run by the Chinese, but was  virtually under the Guando ng Army’s  co ntro l.48
The new Prime Minis ter Inukai accepted and suppo rted the Guando ng Army’s  o ccupatio n plans . After being appo inted as  Prime
Minis ter, Inukai called a general electio n in February 1932 in o rder to  secure a po pular mandate. His  Seiyūkai Party argued fo r a
‘s tro ng’ China po licy and eco no mic reco very, co ntras ting them to  Minseitō ’s  (Shidehara’s ) ‘so ft’ China po licy and its  failed eco no mic
reco very schemes . Inukai’s  Seiyūkai wo n a lands lide victo ry (301 seats ) agains t Minseitō  (146), which lo s t mo re than 100  seats
fro m the previo us  electio n o f 20  February 1930.49
A few facto rs  co ntributed to  this  victo ry. Firs t, two  bo urgeo is  po litical parties  suppressed severely the radical left centered o n the
co mmunis ts , who  held to  an anti-imperialism and anti-imperial war po licy. Seco nd, fo r the pas t five mo nths  s ince September 1931,
the mass  media had been s tirring jingo ism and suppo rting the aggress ive China po licy, while the right wing o f the mass-based
parties , such as  the So cial Mass  Party, prio ritized natio n/empire o ver class .50  Third, Inukai’s  decis io n o n the go ld embargo  in
December co ntributed to  an eco no mic reco very, which was  welco med by the po pulatio n when the o fficial f igure o f unemplo yment
was  clo se to  half a millio n. Fo urth, o n 20  February 1932, electio n day, the Japanese military s tarted a full-s cale attack in Shanghai,51
further fueling jingo ism.
In December 1931 when Iwanaga pro po sed a news  agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia, therefo re, the fo reign po licy elite
assumed that so me fo rm o f an ‘auto no mo us ’ s tate wo uld so o n be created in this  military-o ccupied area. Iwanaga pro po sed a
‘natio nal’ news  agency fo r a trans itio nal go vernment befo re the exact nature o f the go vernment was  wo rked o ut.
Iwanaga’s  pro po sal o f December 1931 was  also  based o n a seco nd assumptio n. Iwanaga regarded Manchuria and the eas tern part
o f Inner Mo ngo lia as  a co herent area, as  relatively auto no mo us  fro m China, and as  within Japan’s  sphere o f influence.52 Acco rdingly,
he called the pro po sed news  agency ‘the news  agency o f Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia’. He assumed that the envisaged ‘new
auto no mo us  s tate’ wo uld eventually integrate the adminis tratio ns  o f all the areas  o f Manchuria and eas tern Inner Mo ngo lia, and
that the pro po sed news  agency wo uld co ver these areas , which were beyo nd the current Guando ng Army’s  o ccupatio n.53
Iwanaga reco gnized, ho wever, that this  ‘natio nal’ news  agency in the military-o ccupied regio n was  no  o rdinary ‘natio nal’ news  agency.
The general principle o f a natio nal news  agency co uld no t be applied here. In the mid-1920s , Iwanaga had o ppo sed s tro ng s tate
co ntro l o ver Japanese news  delivery in China, arguing that an abundant, and high-quality news  supply wo uld bes t serve pro paganda
o bjectives .54 Fo r the Japanese metro po litan ‘natio nal’ news  agency, he also  s till s tressed edito rial independence in December 1931.
In co ntras t, Iwanaga was  aware o f the s trategic ro le o f his  pro po sed news  agency in military-o ccupied Manchuria. He argued that the
pro po sed news  agency sho uld be o fficially co ntro lled, and sho uld mo no po lize news  delivery in the regio n jus t as  the So viet Tass ,
the s tate-funded news  agency, did. Witho ut s tate co ntro l, he argued, the area wo uld beco me ‘a dumping market o f fo reign and
Chinese pro paganda’, and this  wo uld o bs truct the effo rts  o f the Japanese metro po litan s tate and the new s tate in Manchuria to
make the wo rld unders tand their po licies  co rrectly.
The pro po sed ‘natio nal’ news  agency in Manchuria and Inner Mo ngo lia no netheless  had features  co mmo n with o ther natio nal news
agencies . Iwanaga argued it sho uld have privileges  fro m the pro po sed new s tate in Manchuria, as  o ther ‘natio nal’ news  agencies  had
fro m their respective s tates . These privileges  were: an exclus ive right to  wireless  co mmunicatio n and firs t access  to  o fficial
s tatements . Iwanaga went further to  sugges t that there sho uld be no  censo rship o f news  in the area so  that news  wo uld no t be
delayed. Fo r the pro po sed news  agency to  be influential, Iwanaga s tressed, its  news  had to  be no t o nly accurate and selective, but
also  speedy and lo w priced.55
Rengō  tried to  implement Iwanaga’s  pro po sal in Manchuria. In January 1932, Furuno  travelled to  Mukden, the headquarters  o f the
Guando ng Army, and met to p o fficers , Lieutenant-Co lo nel Ho njō  Shigeru, Co lo nel Itagaki Seishirō , and Lieutenant-Co lo nel Ishiwara
Kanji. He also  saw Do ihara Kenji, the head o f the Army’s  Special Service Unit at Harbin. Furuno  had kno wn Itagaki well s ince the time
he had been po s ted to  Ko kusai’s  Beijing Bureau in 1920–23.56  These o fficers  endo rsed Iwanaga’s  pro po sal. They shared Iwanaga’s
view that ‘news  was  central in pro paganda and a news  agency wo uld be a crucial ins titutio n o f pro paganda war’.57
CONFLICTS IN METROPOLITAN POLITICS
Internal fights , chao s  and co nfus io n do minated po litics  in To kyo  until June 1932. This  delayed the pro cess  o f es tablishing the news
agency in Manchuria. As  Satō  Junko  o bserves , the metro po litan s tate was  far fro m reaching co nsensus  o n info rmatio n po licy.58  The
Inukai Cabinet had to  wo rk o n eco no mic reco very, while dealing with Seiyūkai’s  internal co nflicts . The two  majo r po litical parties
(Seiyūkai and Minseitō ) were also  challenged by a series  o f military co up attempts  and terro ris t attacks , and military factio nal
fights  were intense in this  perio d.
Such develo pments  o ccurred no t despite, but because o f the rise o f mass  po litics  in the late 1920s  and early 1930s , and in this
co ntext, party po liticians  themselves  co ntributed to  their o wn decline. Bo th the Seiyūkai and Minseitō  go vernments  were
respo ns ible fo r suppress io n o f the radicals  and the left o f the new po litical fo rces . The Minseitō  go vernment, which had wo n the
electio n o f February 1930, fo r example, arres ted the co mmunis ts  so o n after this  victo ry. At the same time, they co -o pted mo derate
pro gress ives  and the right. The Minseitō -do minated Ho use o f Representative passed a bill to  allo w female franchise at the municipal
level (but no t natio nal level) in May 1930. In o rder to  so lve intens ifying indus trial disputes , the Ho use o f Representatives  also
passed the refo rmed Labo ur Unio n Law, and Labo ur Dispute Mediatio n Law in March 1931.
Meanwhile, Seiyūkai’s  o ppo rtunis tic attacks  were detrimental to  parliamentary demo cracy. Pressed by the eco no mic depress io n, the
Minseitō  go vernment pursued disarmament po licy, and co ncluded the Lo ndo n Naval Disarmament Treaty in early April 1930 . The
o ppo s itio n party, Seiyūkai, led by Inukai Tsuyo shi, and the Navy’s  Chief o f General Staff ( Gunrei buchō), attacked the go vernment,
arguing that this  treaty vio lated the prero gative o f supreme co mmand o f the military that had been defined by the Meiji Co ns titutio n.
The actio n undermined the co nventio n o f parliamentary demo cracy and the autho rity o f the elected go vernment. While the matter
was  finally settled in September, a pers is tent campaign by Seiyūkai and Navy hardliners  s tirred right-wing fanatics , and Prime
Minis ter Hamaguchi Osachi was  sho t in No vember 1930.
In March 1931, the ratif icatio n o f this  disarmament treaty in the Diet pro mpted a failed military co up (the March Incident) that
so ught to  mo bilize ‘pro letarian parties ’ and ‘left-wing and right-wing’ masses  to  attack the headquarters  o f Minseitō , Seiyūkai and
the Prime Minis ter’s  o fficial res idence.59
While the military was  increas ing its  po litical po wer, it was  also  deeply divided. The Guando ng Army and its  liais ing Army o fficers  in
To kyo  were increas ingly unhappy no t o nly with the ‘so ft’ appro ach by the Minseitō  go vernment to  anti-Japanese mo vements  in
Manchuria, but also  with the to p s taff o f the Minis try o f the Army. In March 1931, they planned a s imultaneo us  attack in Manchuria
and a co up attempt in To kyo  fo r later in the year.6 0  The attack in Manchuria was  executed in September 1931.
The co up attempt in To kyo  was , ho wever, abo rted in Octo ber 1931 (the Octo ber Incident). The Octo ber Incident was  led by a gro up o f
middle-ranking o fficers  mainly fro m the Army. Its  aim was  to  assass inate the Cabinet members , o ccupy the metro po litan po lice
headquarters , and fo rce the to p level o f the Army to  create a new Army-led cabinet.6 1 After this  failed attempt, the Army’s  to p level
became mo re vigilant agains t subvers ive actio ns  by middle and lo wer-ranking o fficers  in asso ciatio n with private terro ris t gro ups
such as  Ketsumeidan. Ketsumeidan shared a s imilar agenda with these middle-ranking o fficers—to  get rid o f majo r bo urgeo is
po litical parties , ‘co rrupt’ with big bus iness  mo ney. No w largely iso lated fro m Army o fficers , but in co ntact with so me Navy o fficers ,
Ketsumeidan targeted po litical party and big bus iness  leaders  in early 1932.6 2 Meanwhile Japanese and Chinese fo rces  were in full-
s cale co nfro ntatio n in Shanghai and the Guando ng Army o ccupied Harbin.
Terro ris t activities  reached a peak in To kyo  in May 1932. Altho ugh Inukai suppo rted the aggress ive China po licy, this  did no t save
him fro m beco ming a terro ris t target. The Inukai Cabinet decided no t to  fo rmally reco gnize Manzho uguo  in March 1932, in o rder to
avo id the accusatio n o f vio lating internatio nal treaties  and further alienating the majo r po wers .6 3 While the po lice s trengthened
surveillance agains t Ketsumeidan in early 1932, the gro up carried o ut a terro ris t attack with so me Navy o fficers  in May 1931 (the
May 15 Incident) in which Inukai was  assass inated.6 4
THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF A COHERENT INFORMATION POLICY, TOKYO AND MUKDEN, JUNE–AUGUST
1932
THE ARMY AND MOFA, TOKYO, JUNE 1932
A co herent go vernment po licy o n Manchuria and news  pro paganda o ver the Manchurian Cris is  began to  appear o nly in the aftermath
o f this  terro ris t attack. Saitō  Mako to , Navy Admiral, fo rmed the natio nal unity go vernment o n 26  May 1932. One o f the urgent
is sues  which the Saitō  Cabinet faced was  to  decide the fo rm o f an imperial superviso ry bo dy o ver Manzho uguo . The main
s takeho lders  were: the Guando ng Army, the Minis try o f the Army, MOFA (and its  miss io ns  in Manchuria), the Co lo nial Minis try, and
the SMR. The Co lo nial Minis try, which was  fo unded in 1929, had been the superviso ry minis try o f the SMR and the Guando ng Agency
(Kantō chō ). The Guando ng Agency was  Japan’s  co lo nial adminis trative bo dy fo r the leased territo ry (fro m China) o f the so uthern tip
o f the Liao do ng peninsula, where two  majo r po rts , Dalian and Po rt Arthur, were lo cated.
After a series  o f dis cuss io ns  amo ng these key players , the imperial superviso ry bo dy was  es tablished as  the Three-in-One Sys tem in
July 1932. It was  a co mpro mise amo ng the Guando ng Army, MOFA and the Co lo nial Minis try (the Guando ng Agency). The Japanese
Ambassado r Extrao rdinary to  Manzho uguo  headed the bo dy and also  served co ncurrently as  the Guando ng Army’s  Co mmander and
the Guando ng Go verno r. The firs t Ambassado r Extrao rdinary was  Mutō  No buyo shi, the Guando ng Army’s  Co mmander.
Altho ugh the Guando ng Army was  do minant in military-o ccupied Manchuria, Tak Matsusaka sugges ts  that it was  no t sufficiently
do minant to  rule the military o ccupied area witho ut nego tiating with o ther s takeho lders  in 1932–3.6 5 The imperial superviso ry bo dy
was  an inter-minis terial bo dy. In 1932–4, the Guando ng Army and the Minis try o f the Army, alo ng with MOFA, tried to  reduce the
influence o f the Co lo nial Minis try (the Guando ng Agency) in this  imperial superviso ry bo dy. They succeeded in this  attempt in
December 1934. The Manchurian Affairs  Bureau replaced the Three-in-One sys tem, and the Army Minis ter became its  head. The o ffice
abso rbed the Guando ng Agency as  o ne sectio n within this  new o ffice. It came, ho wever, directly under the Prime Minis ter (To kyo ),
no t the Minis try o f the Army.6 6  The po wer dynamics  amo ng these co mpeting fo rces  shaped news  pro paganda po licy in Japanese-
o ccupied Manchuria in mid-late 1932.
Ano ther layer o f bureaucracy further co mplicated these po wer dynamics . The Co uncil o f the State was  the adminis trative bo dy o f
Manzho uguo , and the co uncil’s  General Affairs  Bo ard was  the main decis io n-making bo dy. Japanese high o fficials  fro m the
metro po litan minis tries  filled its  key po s ts , while its  co ntro l was  essentially in the hands  o f the Guando ng Army.6 7 Altho ugh the
Guando ng Army was  do minant and increased its  po wer o ver time, as  Masumi Junno suke indicates , there were co ns tant internal
co nflicts  amo ng diverse Japanese gro ups . MOFA, fo r example, used the Meiji Co ns titutio n to  argue that the military sho uld no t
intervene in civilian affairs  in o ccupied Manchuria. MOFA and the Minis try o f Finance bo th used the co ns titutio n to  legitimize their
co ntro l o ver adminis trative matters , while also  pro mo ting metro po litan minis terial interes ts .6 8
When the new Saitō  Cabinet was  fo rmed, the League’s  Lytto n Co mmiss io n was  in the middle o f co nducting an inquiry in Manchuria.
The go vernment had to  wo rk o ut an effective campaign to  present the Japanese case to  the co mmiss io n, the ‘internatio nal public’,
and the League. It ins tructed MOFA and the Army to  re-s tart co o rdinating o verseas  news  pro paganda, which Mo ri Kaku o f the Inukai
Cabinet had begun in December 1931, but which had s ince been dis rupted.
Acco rding to  the no te written by the Bo ard o f Info rmatio n in April 1941, the Army and MOFA fo rmed an info rmal co mmittee (Jikyo ku
dō shikai) to  co o rdinate external and do mes tic pro paganda (Keihatsu senden) so o n after the Saitō  Cabinet was  fo rmed. This
co mmittee held its  firs t meeting at MOFA so me time in June 1932.6 9  I will call this  co mmittee the June Co mmittee.
Furuno ’s  bio graphy claims  that MOFA to o k the initiative, and Iwanaga and Furuno  played a key ro le in bringing an o therwise reluctant
Army o n bo ard. It explains  that the Army and Dentsū News  Agency o ppo sed Iwanaga’s  pro po sal to  amalgamate Dentsū and Rengō .
This  was  because bo th Dentsū and the Army saw the amalgamatio n as  the creatio n o f a Rengō -centred news  agency. As  MOFA had
been clo se to  Rengō , it co ntinues , the Army saw this  mo ve as  a MOFA plo t to  do minate the pro po sed ins titutio n.70  Iwanaga asked
Furuno  to  o verco me Army o ppo s itio n to  the amalgamatio n. Furuno  used his  co ntact, Lieutenant-Co lo nel Suzuki Teiichi (1888–
1989), who m Furuno  had kno wn s ince their time to gether in Beijing in the early 1920s . Furuno , as  his  bio graphy claims , pro po sed to
Iwanaga to  invo lve Suzuki no t o nly in the nego tiatio ns  fo r this  amalgamatio n, but also  in the inter-minis try co mmittee o n
info rmatio n.71 The po litics  o f the amalgamatio n o f Dentsū and Rengō  was , therefo re, far mo re co mplex than the s imple dicho to my
o f pro -aggress io n Army (Dentsū) versus  peace-lo ving MOFA (Rengō ).
Acco rding to  the abo ve-mentio ned no te by the Bo ard o f Info rmatio n o f 1941, this  info rmal June Co mmittee’s  firs t meeting was
attended by three members  fro m MOFA and fo ur fro m the Army (two  fro m the Minis try o f the Army and two  fro m the Army’s  General
Staff Office). At the firs t meeting the Army’s  General Staff Office submitted the do cument, ‘The Bas ic Plan fo r Overseas  Pro paganda’.
It argued fo r co nducting pro active, no t defens ive, pro paganda. The main message o f such pro paganda wo uld be, it argued, to  tell
ho w crucial the eco no mic develo pment o f Manchuria was  fo r Japan. The pro paganda wo uld target mainly big po wers , but also  no t
neglect small co untries . The plan also  pro po sed to  integrate the Army’s  and MOFA’s  o verseas  activities .72
In June 1932, bo th MOFA and the Army wo rried abo ut internatio nal public o pinio n. The Lytto n Co mmiss io n was  finishing up its  inquiry
in Manchuria and was  co ming back to  To kyo  in early July. The newly fo rmed info rmal info rmatio n co mmittee (the June Co mmittee)
had to  make the Japanese case to  the co mmiss io n as  well as  to  the internatio nal public o pinio n o f the League’s  member co untries
and the U.S.
The Army, ho wever, had a mo re ambitio us  plan—the fo rmatio n o f a central o ffice fo r info rmatio n management fo r the to tal war
sys tem. By this  s tage, bo th the Army and MOFA had co me to  regard o verseas  and do mes tic pro paganda as  integral, and unders to o d
united do mes tic suppo rt as  crucial fo r success ful fo reign po licy. In July 1932, the co mmittee agreed that it wo uld aim to  enco mpass
a bro ader area o f info rmatio n management in the future. To  this  end, it decided to  include o ther relevant minis tries—MOC, the Ho me
Minis try, and the Minis try o f Educatio n.73
The Army pushed its  agenda further. In Augus t 1932, after co nsulting with these minis tries , Lieutenant-Co lo nel Suzuki Teiichi
submitted a pro po sal to  the co mmittee. Suzuki was  clo se to  the Army’s  Co ntro l Factio n (Tōseiha), which was  attuned to  s tatis t
refo rmism and the creatio n o f the to tal war sys tem. He was  also  so o n to  head the Newspaper Sectio n at the Minis try o f the Army in
1933–5. In Augus t 1932, he argued that ‘a new co mmittee o n do mes tic and o verseas  pro paganda’ sho uld be created at the Cabinet
Office. It sho uld be chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, and co ns is t o f two  members  respectively fro m MOFA, the Army, and the Navy,
and o ne fro m the Ho me Minis try, the Minis try o f Educatio n, and MOC. Its  main o bjectives  were: ‘to  dis cuss  and research pro paganda
po licies  and means  in o rder to  unify and s trengthen current pro paganda activities ’; and ‘to  research and prepare the co o rdinatio n o f
info rmatio n and pro paganda o rganizatio ns  fo r a cris is  o r war’74 Suzuki’s  pro po sal aimed to  create a permanent central o rganizatio n
to  manage info rmatio n at the Cabinet Office as  a part o f the to tal war sys tem, no t o nly fo r the inter-minis terial co o rdinatio n o f
o verseas  pro paganda o peratio ns  with a specific aim.
MOFA AND THE GUANDONG ARMY, MUKDEN, SUMMER 1932
In summer 1932 the June Co mmittee declined to  endo rse the Army’s  pro po sal fo r a central s tate o ffice to  manage a bro ad range o f
info rmatio n gathering and dis seminating o peratio ns  as  a part o f the to tal war sys tem. Rather, it identif ied the mo s t urgent is sue as
o verseas  pro paganda, no t do mes tic tho ught co ntro l, and called fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū o peratio ns  in
Manchuria.75 Reflecting this  fo reign po licy prio rity, in summer 1932, MOFA led metro po litan inter-minis try co o rdinatio n o f news
pro paganda o peratio ns  in Manchuria. It acted quickly. Shirato ri To shio , then MOFA’s  Directo r o f the Department o f Info rmatio n, sent
Secretary Suma Yakichirō  to  Mukden with this  miss io n.
Co rrespo nding to  this  co herent appro ach o f the metro po litan go vernment, inter-minis terial co o rdinatio n o f info rmatio n po licy
began in Manzho uguo  in Augus t 1932. There, it was  decided that the es tablishment o f a ‘natio nal’ news  agency fo r Manzho uguo  was
a prio rity. On 17–18  Augus t 1932, the firs t meeting o f an inter-minis terial co mmittee was  held at the Yamato  Ho tel in Mukden. The
co mmittee (which I call the Mukden Co mmittee) co ns is ted o f representatives  o f the Guando ng Army’s  General Staff Office, the
Japanese Co nsulate at Mukden, the Guando ng Agency, the SMR, and the Manzho uguo  adminis tratio n. They decided to  ho ld mo nthly
meetings . In this  firs t two -day meeting, they dis cussed general is sues , such as  co ntro l o ver media o rganizatio ns  in Manzho uguo ,
and the co nso lidatio n o f Japanese-run (pro -Japan) newspapers  in Chinese, English, Russ ian, Ko rean, and Japanese languages  in
Manzho uguo  and the leased Guando ng area.76  The co mmittee then decided that ‘it was  an abso lute necess ity to  es tablish a news
agency in Manchuria, and make Manzho uguo  advance into  the internatio nal news  wo rld’. This  pro po sed news  agency’s  main ro le was
o verseas  pro paganda. In this  dis cuss io n, they clearly identif ied Iwanaga’s  pro po sal o f December 1931 as  a blueprint, and used his
term, the ‘news  agency o f Manchuria and [Inner] Mo ngo lia’, fo r the planned news  agency. The term, the ‘Manzho uguo  (Natio nal) News
Agency’, had no t yet emerged.77
The Guando ng Army to o k charge o f the fo rmatio n o f this  news  agency in Manchuria. When MOFA’s  Secretary Suma Yakichirō  arrived
at Mukden, his  main co ntact was  a man fro m the Guando ng Army, Sato mi Hajime. Sato mi was , ho wever, no t a military o fficer, but an
SMR man, currently seco nded to  wo rk at the Fo urth Department o f the Guando ng Army. The garriso n entrus ted Sato mi with the task
o f es tablishing the news  agency in Manzho uguo .
Sato mi was  no  s tranger to  Japan’s  news  pro paganda in China. Having graduated fro m the Shanghai-based Japanese imperial
ins titutio n, the Eas t As ia Co mmo n Culture Academy,78  Sato mi was  fluent in Chinese, and had extens ive co ntacts  in China, including
in the pro -Japanese undergro und. While Sato mi had been a s tringer agent fo r Japanese military intelligence and an o pium dealer, he
had also  been engaged in news  pro paganda at Japanese-funded newspapers  in Tianjin and Beijing. He then became a ‘co nsultant’ fo r
the SMR’s  Nanjing o ffice, and fo llo wing the Manchurian Incident, he was  called to  the SMR’s  headquarters  at Mukden.
Suma and Sato mi had kno wn each o ther s ince they spent time to gether in Beijing. In Mukden in the summer o f 1932, they wo rked
o ut a plan fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū. Sato mi then wro te an o utline o f the pro po sed news  agency fo r the Fo urth
Department o f the Guando ng Army’s  General Staff Office.79
In September 1932, the Guando ng Army sent Sato mi to  To kyo  o n three majo r miss io ns : to  get funding fro m MOFA; to  so rt o ut the
technical details  o f the use o f teleco mmunicatio n infras tructure in Manzho uguo  with the Minis try o f the Army and MOC; and to  get
an agreement fo r the integratio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū.
The timing co uld no t have been a co incidence—Sato mi arrived in To kyo  at the precise mo ment when the new (info rmal) inter-
minis terial co mmittee to  co o rdinate Japan’s  info rmatio n po licy was  o rganized.
THE INFORMAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE (THE SEPTEMBER COMMITTEE) AND THE ‘NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY’, TOKYO AND CHANGCHUN,
SEPTEMBER 1932 to  1933
In To kyo , the majo rity in the June Co mmittee regarded o verseas  pro paganda, no t the creatio n o f the to tal war sys tem, as  the s tate’s
prio rity in late summer 1932. The co mmittee co ncluded that it wo uld take to o  lo ng to  get o fficial appro val fo r Lieutenant-Co lo nel
Suzuki’s  pro po sed permanent central o rganizatio n to  manage info rmatio n at the Cabinet Office. Meanwhile the Lytto n Co mmiss io n
was  abo ut to  pro duce its  repo rt. The co mmittee s tressed the press ing need to  co nduct co o rdinated o verseas  pro paganda targeting
the League. As  a result, a new info rmal info rmatio n co mmittee was  fo rmed in September 1932 (I call it the September Co mmittee).
The new co mmittee no netheless  did no t to tally reject Suzuki’s  pro po sal: its  member minis tries  remained as  extens ive as  Suzuki
had wanted. Suzuki himself agreed that o verseas  pro paganda was  the utmo s t prio rity at that time,8 0  and he mus t have been
satis fied that the co mmittee retained the po tential to  co ver a bro ader area o f info rmatio n management in the future.
MAP 3: Manz ho uguo  News Agency’s net wo rk in 19 4 3
So urce: Manshūko ku t sūshinsha ed., Kokutsū jūnen shi
(Xinjing [Changchun]: Edit o r, [19 4 2]), n.p.;
T sūshinshashi kankō kai ed., Tsūshinshashi (T o kyo :
Edit o r, 19 58), p. 39 2.
MOFA led this  co mmittee o f inter-minis try co o rdinatio n o n info rmatio n po licy and o peratio ns . This  reflected the co mmittee’s  prio rity
o n o verseas  pro paganda. The Saitō  Cabinet’s  co nclus io n o f a diplo matic agreement with Manzho uguo  in mid-September also
s trengthened MOFA’s  po s itio n, as  Manchurian affairs  were no w ‘diplo matic’, no t co lo nial o r military matters . The Vice-Minis ter o f
MOFA (then Arita Hachirō ) headed the September Co mmittee, no t the Cabinet Secretary, no r Suzuki fro m the Minis try o f the Army.
The co mmittee met every Tuesday afterno o n at MOFA. After January 1933, it became a lunchtime dis cuss io n gro up, until it became
fo rmalized as  the Cabinet Info rmatio n Co mmittee in July 1936.8 1
The duties  o f this  September Co mmittee were: to  wo rk o n the Fo reign Minis ter’s  o fficial s tatements , and dis seminate a message o n
ho w critical the eco no mic develo pment o f Manchuria was  fo r the Japanese empire; to  make the Minis tries  o f Fo reign Affairs , the
Army, the Navy, and Educatio n info rm their o verseas  miss io ns  and o verseas  Japanese s tudents  co rrectly and tho ro ughly o n
Japanese po licies , and co -o pt these o verseas  Japanese to  co nduct their pro paganda activities ; to  enco urage fo reign jo urnalis ts ’
vis its  to  Manchuria and make them ‘unders tand’ its  ‘de facto  independence fro m China’; to  sho w the Lytto n Co mmiss io n united
suppo rt fro m the Japanese peo ple fo r the actio n in Manchuria; and make the co mmiss io n favo urable to  Japan’s  actio n. The
co mmittee saw the League as  Japan’s  pro paganda target, altho ugh it did no t neglect the s ignificance o f uniting do mes tic o pinio n.8 2
Sato mi Hajime arrived in To kyo  fro m Mukden jus t as  the September Co mmittee was  fo rmed, which meant that he met o fficials  who
were wo rking o ut a co herent o verseas  pro paganda po licy at the metro po litan centre.8 3 Sato mi’s  vis it (and the events  in Manchuria)
pro mpted speedy and co o rdinated actio ns  by the o therwise fragmented and co mpeting metro po litan minis tries  in To kyo . Shirato ri
immediately assured MOFA’s  funding o f ¥200 ,000  fo r the fo undatio n and ¥240,000  fo r the firs t year o f the pro po sed new agency’s
o peratio n in Manzho uguo . The Minis try o f the Army and MOC also  nego tiated the details  o f the news  agency’s  use o f wireless  in
Manzho uguo  during Sato mi’s  o ne-mo nth vis it to  To kyo .8 4
Sato mi unders to o d that the third o bjective was  the hardes t. Since late 1931, Rengō  had been taking the initiative in fo unding the
pro po sed news  agency in Manzho uguo . Dentsū saw it as  a plo t fo r Rengō  and MOFA to  es tablish Rengō ’s  do minance in Manchuria.
Persuaded by patrio tic rheto ric, ho wever, Dentsū co mpro mised. Sato mi managed to  gain a partial, yet satis facto ry agreement fro m
Dentsū that news  input wo uld be channeled to  the s ingle pro po sed new news  agency in Manchuria, while o utgo ing news  wo uld be
dis tributed to  bo th Rengō  and Dentsū.8 5
Upo n Sato mi’s  return to  Manchuria, the Guando ng Army anno unced the fo rmatio n o f the Manzho uguo  News  Agency (MNA) o n 15
No vember 1932. It was  fo rmally es tablished o n the sno wy firs t day o f December in Changchun. Changchun was  no w called Xinjing,
the new capital o f Manzho uguo . The Guando ng Army also  mo ved its  headquarters  fro m Mukden to  Changchun.
The making o f the natio nal/imperial news  agency in To kyo  pro ved,
ho wever, far mo re diff icult. Metro po litan minis tries  guarded their
o wn jurisdictio ns . No r were no n-o fficial gro ups  ready to  s tand as ide,
and there was  no  po litical will o r mechanism to  fo rce them to  do  so .
Dentsū and its  clients , pro vincial newspapers , s tro ngly o ppo sed the
Rengō -initiated amalgamatio n plan.
Acco rding to  the Amō  memo  o f 1935, the Cabinet fo rmally decided
o n the amalgamatio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū and the creatio n o f a
s tro ng and united news  agency in September 1932, mo s t likely in the
firs t meeting o f the September Co mmittee. Amō ’s  memo  said: ‘the
creatio n o f this  s tro ng natio nal news  agency was  needed fo r s tate
po licy’, and ‘the go vernment was  determined to  achieve this  go al
agains t all o dds ’. Amō ’s  predecesso r as  Directo r o f the Department
o f Info rmatio n, Shirato ri To shio , began to  nego tiate with Rengō
s traight away, while Army Lieutenant-Co lo nel Ao ki Shigemasa talked
to  Dentsū.8 6  The amalgamatio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū and the
creatio n o f the united news  agency were s imultaneo us ly nego tiated
in To kyo  and Manchuria.
In To kyo , the go vernment’s  vis io n was  largely based o n what Iwanaga
had pro po sed in December 1931. Ano ther to p-secret no te o f 26
September 1932, mo s t likely written by Amō , co nfirmed the
go vernment’s  decis io n to  create a united natio nal news  agency in
Japan. It res tated Iwanaga’s  reaso ning o n why Japan needed the
s tro ng news  agency, why the two  majo r news  agencies  needed to  be
united, and why the s tate needed to  suppo rt the pro po sed news
agency.8 7 The fo rm o f the pro po sed news  agency was  an AP mo del o f
a co -o perative o f news  media o rganizatio ns , as  Iwanaga had
o utlined.8 8
This  no te o f 26  September 1932 clarif ied the s trategic ro le o f the
pro po sed news  agency. Saitō  Hiro shi, then MOFA’s  Directo r o f the
Department o f Info rmatio n (January 1929–May 1930), had al
ready made this  po int in early 1929. It was  the firs t time MOFA regarded the natio nal news  agency as  a s tate agency. Saitō  then
no ted:
One do es  no t need to  detail the very impo rtant ro le which news  agencies  wo uld play in future fo reign po licy. All
mo dern s tates  have o r sho uld have an influential news  agency. Do mes tically, it wo uld explain do mes tic and
internatio nal affairs  to  all the natio nals , and nurture healthy [natio nal] public o pinio n. Externally, it wo uld repo rt its
o wn co untry’s  affairs  and views  in detail and quickly [to  the wo rld], while repo rting fo reign affairs  [to  Japan] so  that
Japan co uld take appro priate s teps  [in fo reign po licy].8 9
In Saitō ’s  view, the natio nal news  agency as  a s tate agency had a s trategic ro le in s tate po licy. Iwanaga’s  pro po sal o f December
1931, ho wever, differed s lightly o n this  po int. It s till maintained that the pro po sed news  agency sho uld be independent fro m the
s tate, but serve the s tate when needed o n a vo luntary bas is .9 0  In co ntras t, s tate o fficials , such as  Saitō  and Amō , assumed o fficial
co ntro l. Amō  dis cussed which minis try sho uld adminis ter the pro po sed news  agency. A draft o n the adminis trative details  o f the
news  agency, which MOFA mo s t likely prepared, s tated that MOFA, the Army, and the Navy wo uld jo intly co ntro l it, each appo inting
Iwanaga at  a dinner part y held by Kent  Co o per o f
AP, New Yo rk, Aut umn 19 32. Iwanaga is in t he fro nt ,
t hird fro m t he left .  So urce: Furuno , Ino suke ed.,
Iwanaga Yūkichi kun (T o kyo : Iwanaga Yūkichi kun
denki kankō  iinkai, 19 4 1).
o ne directo r o f the bo ard. The o ther fo ur directo rs  wo uld be elected fro m amo ng the asso ciated members  o f the pro po sed news
agency at their general assembly, as  the agency was , like Rengō , to  fo llo w an AP mo del o f a co -o perative o f news  media
o rganizatio ns . Furthermo re, ‘the appo intment and dismissal o f these [elected] directo rs  as  well as  the pres ident needed appro val by
these minis ters , except fo r tho se who m the minis ters  had appo inted’.9 1
The go vernment’s  nego tiatio ns  with Rengō  and Dentsū, therefo re, assumed s tro nger s tate co ntro l o ver the pro po sed united news
agency than did Iwanaga’s  pro po sal o f December 1931. The go vernment sugges ted to  bo th news  agencies  that it wo uld buy o ut the
two  o rganizatio ns ’ respective news  departments  with ¥1,100 ,000 .
The September Co mmittee no netheless  ado pted ano ther po int o f Iwanaga’s  pro po sal: the pro po sed news  agency sho uld have
privileges  fro m the s tate, such as  exclus ive right to  use wireless  co mmunicatio n. The go vernment indeed threatened Rengō  and
Dentsū that if they did no t co o perate, they wo uld be deprived o f the privilege.9 2 The go vernment knew this  was  a s tro ng bargaining
chip to  make them dro p o ppo s itio n to  the amalgamatio n. If they were to  lo se this  wireless  co mmunicatio n privilege, they co uld no t
gather and deliver internatio nal news  co mpetently.
Rengō  respo nded po s itively. After all, it was  a plan largely fo rmulated by Iwanaga. MOFA s till asked Rengō  fo rmally in Octo ber 1933
whether it wo uld go  alo ng with the amalgamatio n scheme. Rengō  replied yes , and res tated what Iwanaga had pro po sed in December
1931.
Rengō , ho wever, tried to  weaken the s tate’s  co ntro l in this  pro cess . Firs t, it wo uld no t demand any mo ney fo r trans ferring its
bus iness  and its  co ntracts  with the o ther majo r internatio nal news  agencies , because unlike Dentsū, it had been a no n-pro fit
o rganizatio n. In o ther wo rds , Rengō  so ught to  retain its  private s tatus . Seco nd, Rengō  also  wanted to  retain edito rial independence,
and put two  co nditio ns  to  the go vernment. One was  that in o rder to  secure the independence and fairness  o f news  repo rting, the
pro po sed news  agency sho uld remain a no n-pro fit co -o perative o f media o rganizatio ns . The o ther co nditio n was  that
representatives  o f these o rganizatio ns  sho uld be co nsulted o n majo r decis io ns .9 3
Pro bably yielding to  Iwanaga’s  persuas iveness , and also  having an abso lute trus t in Iwanaga, MOFA s tepped back and agreed to
these co nditio ns . As  a result, by late 1933, the plan fo r direct s tate co ntro l o ver directo rs  and management seems  to  have been
dro pped.
In 1931–33, o verseas  pro paganda, no t the co ntro l o f do mes tic o pinio n, remained a go vernment prio rity. The go vernment dis cussed
the co ntro l o f do mes tic o pinio n as  relevant to  specific fo reign po licies . Furthermo re, while jo int minis terial supervis io n fo r the news
agency was  pro po sed in autumn 1932, MOFA had been mo s t influential in this  pro cess . Its  Department o f Info rmatio n had led the
nego tiatio ns  fo r the amalgamatio n o f Rengō  and Dentsū. The Ho me Minis try (in charge o f do mes tic tho ught co ntro l) was  no t
included in this  jo int supervis io n team.
Rengō ’s  s trategic ro le fo r the s tate was  further articulated during the diplo matic cris is . One episo de demo ns trates  this  po int. On 27
May 1933, Iwanaga sent a letter to  AP’s  General Manager, Kent Co o per, co nfirming Rengō ’s  new service to  AP. Rengō  wo uld send a
text o f Japanese o fficial s tatements  and co mmuniqués , fo r which Rengō  wo uld prepay the co s t. AP wo uld fo rward them to  the
Japanese Ambassado r in Washingto n D.C., to  the Co nsul-General in New Yo rk, and if feas ible, to  the Co nsul-General in San
Francis co . AP was  ‘at liberty to  give o ut these messages  in full o r in summary to  its  members  in the United States  fo r publicatio n’.
Co o per unders to o d that this  was  a cheaper way fo r the Japanese go vernment to  send its  messages  in the U.S. than us ing the
go vernment cables  and wireless . In return, AP wo uld get the info rmatio n mo re quickly than its  co mpetito rs . Co o per was  happy to
accept this  o ffer.9 4 Rengō  made a s imilar arrangement with Reuters  and Havas .9 5 The episo de sugges ted that Rengō  was  acting in
the s tate’s  interes t. At the same time, AP co llabo rated with Rengō  with clear unders tanding o f its  intentio n. Such a co nventio n was
no t regarded as  a co mpro mise o f jo urnalis tic co des  o f co nduct at the time, but as  a widely practiced no rm. It is  wo rth no ting that
this  agreement between Rengō  and AP was  co ncluded during the perio d o f diplo matic tens io n between Japan and o ther co untries ,
especially the U.S.
CONCLUSION
The s tate began to  co o rdinate o verseas  news  pro paganda
o peratio ns  during the Manchurian Cris is  o f 1931–3. This  diplo matic
cris is , which s tarted with the Guando ng Army’s  aggress io n in
Manchuria in September 1931, exacerbated the pro blems  o f party
go vernments  in the age o f mass  po litics  and eco no mic depress io n
as  a series  o f military co up attempts  and terro ris t attacks  ro cked
po litics  in To kyo  in 1931–2. In this  co ntext, a co herent info rmatio n
po licy did no t emerge until late May 1932. The natio nal unity cabinet
was  fo rmed after the May 15th Incident claimed the life o f Prime
Minis ter Inukai.
The Army began an attempt to  create a to tal war sys tem, in which a
bro ad range o f info rmatio n management was  to  be centralized at the
Cabinet Office. This  attempt was , ho wever, unsuccess ful in 1932–3.
The main co ncern o f the po licy elite at this  s tage remained fo reign
po licy, especially develo pments  at the League o f Natio ns  and in the
U.S. This  was  why MOFA led the inter-minis terial info rmatio n
co mmittee, which fo cused o n o verseas  news  pro paganda and no t
tho ught co ntro l o r do mes tic mo bilizatio n, and why this  co mmittee
identified the creatio n o f the natio nal news  agency as  the mo s t
urgent prio rity.
Iwanaga’s  po licy inputs  were critical in this  develo pment as  he
presented a blueprint fo r this  natio nal/imperial news  agency in To kyo  and ano ther fo r a natio nal/co lo nial news  agency fo r newly
o ccupied Manchuria in December 1931. Rengō  wo rked clo sely with MOFA in To kyo  fo r the fo rmer pro ject, while it wo rked with the
Guando ng Army in Manchuria fo r the latter. All these ins titutio n-making pro cesses  in To kyo  and Manchuria (the inter-minis terial
info rmatio n co o rdinatio n o ffice, the natio nal/imperial news  agency at the metro po litan centre, and the creatio n o f a news  agency in
a puppet regime) were clo sely co nnected. In this  co ntext, the s tate shaped the bas ic nature o f the pro po sed united natio nal news
agency in Japan.
In the diplo matic cris is  o f 1931–3, no t o nly MOFA, but also  the Army reco gnized the s ignificance o f mass  po litics  and ‘internatio nal
public o pinio n’. They felt the need fo r pro paganda to  the League, its  Lytto n Co mmiss io n, the U.S., and China.
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